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Should Finance Own DORA Third-Party Risk, or Leave It to IT?Regulatory Obligations Management
4 min readFor CFOs & Financial Reporting Officers

Should Finance Own DORA Third-Party Risk, or Leave It to IT?

By Regulatory CouncilPublished

The Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA) has published its Annual Work Programme for 2027. Key priorities include digital operational resilience, technological innovation, sustainable finance, securitization, and cross-sectoral risk monitoring. Under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), the ESAs will continue oversight of critical ICT third-party service providers.

For CFOs and financial reporting officers, this raises a crucial question: Who owns third-party risk under DORA? Does it belong to technology and operational risk, or should finance have a significant role with real accountability?

The question at hand

DORA is often seen as an IT and operational resilience issue. The ESAs' oversight of critical ICT third-party providers supports this view. However, the regulatory obligations stemming from DORA, including contractual arrangements, concentration risk, and the vendor risk profile of providers supporting critical functions, impact budgets, disclosures, and the control environment that finance certifies.

So, the debate is practical. Should finance actively own ICT third-party risk, or should it rely on outputs from IT and risk functions and remain focused on its core responsibilities?

The case for finance staying in its lane

Practitioners who advocate for a limited finance role offer several strong arguments.

Expertise matters. Evaluating a cloud provider's exit strategy, subcontracting chain, or incident notification capability requires technical expertise. Finance teams often lack this. Involving CFO staff in ICT-related incident classification or digital operational resilience testing design could dilute accountability and slow decision-making.

Clear lines of defense. The three-lines model functions best with clear ownership. If finance co-owns third-party risk, who challenges whom? A CFO involved in running the program can't credibly oversee it.

Bandwidth. Finance leaders are already managing ESG reporting obligations, securitization requirements, and the usual close-and-report cycle. The ESAs' work programme indicates ongoing activity across several domains. Adding vendor oversight to this workload is a significant burden.

Simplification agenda. The work programme also mentions the European Commission's goal of reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens. Some practitioners see this as a reason to avoid creating new cross-functional structures until the supervisory landscape is clearer.

The case for finance taking active ownership

The opposing view is equally grounded in institutional operations.

Finance already holds the critical data. Spend, contract terms, renewal dates, and payment flows are managed in finance systems. A register of ICT providers that doesn't reconcile with the accounts payable ledger is incomplete. Finance often identifies unclassified providers first.

Impact tolerance involves financial judgment. Setting tolerances for disruption to important business services requires quantifying the consequences of an outage: client harm, regulatory exposure, remediation cost. These inputs come from finance. Without them, tolerances are engineering estimates rather than business decisions.

Internal control implications are significant. If an ICT provider supports systems feeding financial reporting, a failure is a control issue, not just an availability problem. Institutions with Sarbanes-Oxley Act exposure already map IT general controls to financial reporting risk under the COSO Internal Control-Integrated Framework. Auditors working under PCAOB Auditing Standards, including AS 2201, will test whether reliance on outsourced systems is supported. DORA adds a parallel mapping that needs reconciliation.

Concentration risk is an enterprise risk. A single critical provider supporting multiple functions is a risk universe issue. Boards will question the CFO about it, regardless of ownership.

Where practitioners actually land

Most don't choose a clear side. In practice, the arrangement typically looks like this:

  • Technology and operational risk own the assessment. Due diligence, resilience testing, and incident handling remain with the teams equipped to evaluate them.
  • Finance owns the data spine. Contract values, provider identifiers, and cost-of-disruption estimates come from finance, ensuring the provider register aligns with the ledger.
  • Finance joins the governance forum. CFO representation on the body that approves critical provider relationships and reviews concentration risk is common, even if finance doesn't run the program.
  • Control objective mapping is shared. Where a DORA obligation overlaps with a financial reporting control, one team documents the link and both sign off.

Teams that struggle often fall into one of two traps: either finance is involved only after a provider fails, or finance is made a co-owner without clear decision rights. Both lead to slow escalation and unclear accountability.

Institutions using a GRC or Integrated Risk Management (IRM) platform have an advantage, as shared data models simplify ledger-to-register reconciliation. However, the platform doesn't resolve the ownership question; it only facilitates execution.

Our take

Finance shouldn't own ICT third-party risk entirely. It should manage the aspects that only finance can oversee.

The most effective ownership model assigns technology and operational risk the lead on assessment and testing, while finance takes on three specific responsibilities: maintaining the financial data for the provider register, supplying cost-of-disruption inputs for impact tolerance, and participating in the governance forum that approves critical provider relationships. This level of involvement prevents blind spots without blurring defense lines.

The tradeoff is real. This model requires finance to invest time in a domain where it lacks expertise and demands disciplined decision rights to avoid co-ownership by default. If your institution can't define these rights clearly, a narrow-lane approach is safer than an undefined partnership.

The ESAs' continued oversight of critical providers means supervisory attention on this topic isn't diminishing. If your finance function can't explain how provider data reconciles with the ledger and how disruption costs inform your tolerances, start there. It's a manageable task, it's defensible, and it positions the CFO as a contributor to resilience rather than a bystander who inherits the consequences.

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